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Abstract 
The extent of the demographic changes in Europe is dramatic and will deeply affect future labor, fi-
nancial and goods markets. The expected strain on public budgets and especially social security has 
already received prominent attention, but aging poses many other economic challenges that threaten 
growth and living standards if they remain unaddressed. 
This paper focuses on three large Continental European countries: France, Germany, and Italy. These 
countries have large pay-as-you-go pension systems and vulnerable labor markets. At the same time, 
they show remarkable resistance against pension and labor market reform. While there is no shortage 
of reform proposals to address population aging, most of those focused on pension and labor market 
reform, little is known about behavioral reactions to such reforms. 
This paper therefore sheds light on the potential benefits of pension and labor market reform for 
growth and living standards, taking into account behavioral reactions to specific reforms. Which be-
havioral reactions will strengthen, which will weaken reform policies? Can Old Europe maintain its 
standard of living even if behavioral reactions offset some of the current reform efforts? 
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1. Introduction 
While aging is global, there are marked international differences in the speed and the extent of 
the aging processes. Even within the industrialized countries, differences are large. Europe 
and Japan have already a much older population than North-America. Italy and Germany, in 
turn, are aging faster than France and Great Britain. Italy and Germany are projected to shrink 
in population size; even more dramatic is the shrinkage of the labor force between 2010 and 
2035 when the German and Italian babyboom generations will retire. To the extent that labor 
force shrinkage precedes population shrinkage, these countries will face steeply falling sup-
port ratios (workers per consumers). One likely implication is slower economic growth and, 
in the worst case, stagnating or falling standards of living if the force of aging is stronger than 
the force of productivity growth. 
This paper has two broad aims. First, it shows that pension and labor market reforms have the 
potential to mitigate much of the negative implications of population aging. Hence, there is a 
good reason to bear the short-run costs of reforms in exchange for the long-run benefits. Sec-
ond, the paper models potential backlashes to reform in order to provide a more realistic as-
sessment of what might be the outcome of the politically complicated reform process in 
Europe. 
The paper is part of a research agenda that analyzes the aging process and its macroeconomic 
implications in Continental Europe, focusing on its three largest countries, France, Germany, 
and Italy, the core of Old Europe. These countries have large public budgets and pay-as-you-
go financed social security systems. Their unsustainability has already received prominent 
attention. In addition, these countries have labor markets characterized by low participation 
rates, high unemployment, and high wages. They are particularly vulnerable to the challenges 
of globalization due to the high tax and contribution burden in total labor compensation. In 
spite of these problems, France, Germany, and Italy have been remarkably resistant to labor 
market and pension reform. If governments anyway manage to push such reforms through 
parliament, workers may thus react adversely and undo at least some of the expected effects 
of the reforms. The main questions posed in this paper are therefore: What can pension and 
labor market reforms ideally achieve? What are possible behavioral reactions to reform poli-
cies? Which direction will they take and how large are they? And ultimately: Can Old Europe 
maintain its high living standards even if behavioral reactions offset some of the current re-
form efforts?   3
Some behavioral reactions will strengthen reform. A good example is raising the statutory 
retirement age. It has direct effects on the labor supply by bringing older individuals to the 
labor market. Indirect effects emerge from endogenous labor supply reactions, e.g., through 
incentive effects generated by the tax and contribution burden that actuarially unfair social 
security systems impose on households. Raising the retirement age will lower social security 
contributions in such pension systems. In response to rising net wages, labor supply may then 
increase at all ages. 
There are, however, also behavioral effects that weaken policy reforms. To take up the same 
example, older workers, now forced to work longer, may exploit part-time opportunities given 
by the pension system. In some countries (e.g., Finland and Germany) such opportunities led 
to a very early transition to part time work with the perverse result that in some sectors hours 
supplied actually decreased in response to pension reform. Along the same line, encouraging 
female labor supply, e.g. through public provision of day care facilities, may precipitate a 
decrease in male labor supply. This within-household substitution would be perfectly rational 
if households desire joint leisure and joint household production. 
Little is known about these behavioral reactions. One of the key issues taken up in this paper 
is therefore to model and calibrate behavioral reactions to reform. Which behavioral reactions 
will strengthen, which will weaken reform policies? What are their quantitative effects? 
We will build a simple model of reforms and reform backlashes into an overlapping genera-
tions model of the Auerbach, Kotlikoff and Skinner (1983)/Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) 
type, extended to a multi-country version (Börsch-Supan, Ludwig and Winter, 2007).
1 As a 
particular feature of our model, we add to the model the distinction between exogenous labor 
supply components (as key results of labor market and pension reform) and endogenous labor 
supply components (in order to represent possible reform backlash). To keep the language 
simple, we call the exogenous labor supply component “labor force participation”, and the 
endogenous labor supply component “working hours”. This language is metaphorical as we 
are well aware that both labor force participation and working hours have endogenous as well 
as exogenous components. 
                                                 
1  Similar multi-country OLG models have been developed, among others, by Feroli (2002), Henriksen (2002), 
Brooks (2003), Domeij and Floden (2006), Attanasio, Kitao and Violante (2006, 2007) and Krüger and 
Ludwig (2007).   4
The metaphorical language chosen comes from our thinking of labor market and pension re-
forms as lifting institutional constraints. Typical constraints are a minimum labor market en-
try age generated by the school system, constraining the labor force participation of the 
young; an early labor market exit age generated by the pension system, effectively constrain-
ing the labor force participation of the old; inflexible working hours and unavailable day care 
facilities, constraining female labor force participation. This view of lifting restrictions moti-
vates our modeling strategy and the language behind it: labor market and pension reforms are 
represented by exogenous changes of labor supply at the extensive margin (the number of 
working persons in an economy). 
Households then are modeled to respond to the changes of labor supply by changing their 
working hours (the intensive margin of labor supply). Endogenous hours’ supply may in-
crease, e.g., if distorting social security taxes and contributions decline as an implication of 
pension reform. The opposite reaction is also possible: endogenous hours’ supply may de-
crease in response to an exogenous change of the number of working persons if there is intra-
household substitution between the number of persons working and the hours worked by each 
person. 
Another important feature of our model is its multi-country nature. No country in Continental 
Europe is even approximately modeled by a closed economy. France, Germany, and Italy 
have large export sectors and considerable foreign direct investments. These provide a second 
source of opportunities during the global aging process: not all income needs to come from 
domestic production, and GNP may become substantially larger than GDP if foreign direct 
investments create large returns. We complement France, Germany, and Italy as countries 
which save more than they invest with the U.S. representing the rest of the world currently 
absorbing the Continental European savings. 
While this feature is important for a credible quantification of our pension and labor market 
reform analysis, it is not the main focus of this paper. We refer to a sister paper, Börsch-
Supan, Ludwig and Winter (2007), which analyzes the resulting international capital flows 
and the associated rate of return developments, including the “asset meltdown hypothesis”. 
The key results of our paper rest on a set of three-way comparisons that are best imagined by 
a two-by-two-by-two table. The first dimension reflects labor market policies. One extreme is 
the complete failure to adapt those institutional restrictions that keep labor force participation 
so low in France, Germany, and Italy. The result are unchanged low labor force participation   5
rates by age and gender also in the future. The polar case, for some an extreme, is the adapta-
tion of all societal systems from kindergarten to retirement policies to increase age and gender 
specific labor force participation rates across the board.  
As a second dimension, we model two extreme positions of pension policy. One extreme is a 
fully-funded, voluntary private accounts system with no distortions and perfect intertemporal 
consumption smoothing. The other extreme is a pay-as-you-go pension system with flat bene-
fits financed by a contribution that is perceived as a pure tax with the associated labor supply 
distortions. 
Finally, the third dimension in these comparisons isolates behavioral effects. One extreme is a 
fixed hours’ supply by each working individual. As polar case, we derive a supply function of 
working hours which is responsive to wages net of taxes and contributions, but also to house-
hold labor participation. 
Our paper shows that direct quantity and indirect behavioral effects are large. They both sig-
nificantly affect economic growth and living standards. Due to strong interaction effects be-
tween pension system and labor markets, a smart combination of pension policy and adapta-
tion of institutions related to the labor market can do more than each policy in isolation. We 
show that they can offset the effects of population aging on economic growth and living stan-
dards. On balance, however, behavioral effects dampen such reform efforts. Taking positive 
and negative behavioral effects into account, a combination of many policy measures is nec-
essary in order to keep per capita consumption from falling behind the secular growth path. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly sets the demographic back-
ground. Section 3 describes the current labor market situation and our labor market reform 
scenarios. Section 4 presents the multi-country computational general equilibrium model with 
a combination of exogenous and endogenous labor supply components. Section 5 delivers our 
main results in the two-by-two-by-two table set up. We vary the institutional framework of 
labor markets and pensions in order to investigate the interactions between pension and em-
ployment policies and the behavioral reactions to pension and labor market reform. Since 
higher old-age labor force participation raises issues of age-specific productivity, they are 
briefly addressed in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.   6
2. Demography 
While the patterns of population aging are similar in most countries, timing and extent differ 
substantially. The United States is considerably younger and will age later and to a slower 
extent than the EU, especially Germany and Italy. This is most graphically depicted in the 
changing population pyramids of our four countries between 2000 and 2050, see figure 1. 
FIGURE 1: Population ageing in France, Germany, Italy, and the U.S., 2000 and 2050 
 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, International Data Base, http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb/pyramids.html 
The differences are startling. While the U.S. population pyramid in 2050 features the normal 
large base, Germany and Italy have strongly inverted population pyramids. The French pyra-
mids change only little between 2000 and 2050, with relatively small differences in cohort 
sizes up to age 70. These differences can largely be attributed to different fertility rates 
(France and the U.S. have fertility rates close to the replacement level, see table 1), while 
Germany and Italy loose about a third of their population from generation to generation due to 
fertility rates that are below 1.4.   7
TABLE 1: Fertility rates and life expectancy 







in year 2050 
France  1.89 80.3 71.3  86 
Germany  1.34 79.0 70.2  84 
Italy  1.29 80.4 71.0  87 
U.S.  2.10 77.8 67.6  83 
Source: Eurostat and U.S. Census (2008); OECD Health Data 2007; WHO (2006); and own computations. 
Life expectancy also differs remarkably among the four countries. This is accentuated in the 
healthy life expectancy, a measure developed by WHO based on functional ability: it meas-
ures the expected age without functional limitation as defined by a set of disability indicators. 
Healthy life expectancy in France is almost four years higher than in the U.S. Note that in 
Europe healthy life expectancy is about 10 years higher than the average retirement age, pro-
viding some room for an increase in retirement age, see section 3. 
We compute the future demography of the four countries based on three key assumptions. 
First, we provide projections of mortality based on a Lee-Carter decomposition, using past 
mortality rate changes derived from the Human Mortality Database (2008). Table 1 shows the 
resulting life expectancies in 2050 (column 5). They coincide with the current UN projections 
for Germany and the U.S., but are slightly higher for France and Italy (UN has age 85 com-
pared while our projections yield age 86 and 87, respectively). 
Second, we assume that fertility rates are exogenous and remain constant as given by table 1. 
Third and similarly, we assume constant and exogenous migration flows, based on the current 
medium variant of the UN projections (France  100,000, Germany 150,000, Italy 135,000, 
and U.S. 1,100,000 net migrants per year) which is about the long-term average. It is impor-
tant to note that these migration flows are small relative to the decline in the labor force pro-
jected in section 3. 
Figure 2 shows the total population aged 15 years and over which will be the base of our pro-
jections and simulations. It reflects the stark differences among the population pyramids that 
we have seen in figure 1. There will be population growth in France and the U.S. but signifi-
cant decline in Germany and a somewhat smaller decline in Italy after 2020, mainly due to the 
higher expected migration to Italy. The fifth line represents the aggregate of France, Ger-  8
many, and Italy which we will call EU-3 in order to represent the three largest Continental 
European countries. 

















Source: Own projection based on assumptions detailed in text 
Truly remarkable is the decline of the working age population (age 20-64), see figure 3. Rela-
tive to total population aged 15 and older, the U.S. will loose about 10% of their working age 
individuals between 2005 and 2050. In Italy, the loss is more than twice as high with 22%. 
France is closer to U.S. and Germany closer to Italy, reflecting the fertility rates in table 1.   9















Source: Own projection based on assumptions detailed in text. Working age is age 20 to 64. 
3. Employment and Labor Market Reforms 
Working age population is not equal to employment. The demographic differences, in particu-
lar those between Italy and the U.S., are dramatically amplified by the differences in labor 
force participation. Figure 4 shows the percentage of individuals employed in the population 
aged 15 and older. This is a variant of the “support ratio” reflecting the number of workers per 
adult consumer. U.S. support rates are much higher than the European ones. In Europe, Italy 
stands out with the lowest support ratio. Unlike to its demographic position, France shares the 
low labor force participation of Continental Europe; current French labor force participation 
rates are actually lower than the German ones.   10
















Source: Own projection based on 2005 labor force participation rates. 
Figure 4 is based on the assumption of constant age and gender specific labor force participa-
tion rates. Given this assumption, Germany has about the same low support ratio in 2005 
which the U.S. will have after 2040. In this sense, Germany is one generation ahead of the US 
when it concerns the macroeconomic balance between individuals in production and indi-
viduals who consume. 
Figure 4 also shows that the decline of the support ratio, given the assumption of no behav-
ioral changes, will be more pronounced in the three European countries than in the U.S. 
(24.3% vs. 15.0% between 2005 and 2050), aggravating the current differences of the support 
ratios among the four countries. 
Aggregate employment is a results of labor market entry age, female labor force participation, 
unemployment rates, and labor market exit age, to name the four most important parameters. 
These parameters are strongly governed by institutional restrictions. Labor market entry age, 
e.g., is a function of the school system. Germany, e.g., has a regulations that generate late 
entries into the school system, a long duration in high schools and universities, and thus a late 
labor market entry age. Similarly, female labor force participation is a function of institutions 
such as kindergarten and afternoon school which tend to be provided by public entities in 
Europe. Unemployment is a function of the duration and generosity of unemployment com-
pensation. Labor market exit, finally, is strongly governed by pension regulations that effec-  11
tively make the early eligibility age also the effective age of labor market withdrawal. Our 
main point is, that from an individual’s point of view, labor supply has important exogenous 
components which restrict possible endogenous labor supply decisions. 
It is unlikely that these exogenous components remain unchanged over the course of popula-
tion aging and the general change of society over the next two decades. We therefore define 
two polar scenarios representing the potential changes in the institutional framework restrict-
ing households’ labor supply decisions:  
•  In the status quo scenario (STATQUO), age and gender specific labor force participation 
rates will remain as they are at baseline in 2005; this was the scenario underlying figure 4. 
•  The labor market reform scenario (LREFORM) includes four reform steps: 
o  RETAGE: an increase in the retirement age by 2 years; 
o  JOBENTRY: a decrease in the job entry age by 2 years; 
o  FEMLFP: an adaptation of female labor force participation rates to those of men; 
o  UNEMP: a reduction of unemployment to 40% of its current level. 
The increments are motivated by actual policy proposals: in Germany, the statutory retirement 
age has been raised from 65 to 67 years in a serious of transitions until about 2020; in France 
and Italy, similar steps will follow with some delay. The change in the European high school 
and university system (the so called Bologna process) is expected to decrease duration in 
schooling by about 2 years. Finally, 40% of current unemployment represents the conven-
tional estimate of the NAIRU (Ball and Mankiw, 2002). 
These reform steps will be phased in linearly between 2010 and 2050. The increase in retire-
ment age (the decrease in the job entry age) is modeled as a shift of the distribution of labor 
force participation rates by age to the right (to the left, respectively), thereby increasing the 
flat part of the distribution in the middle, see figure 5. 
Overall, these reform steps do not appear to be overly radical; in fact, their combination 
would lead in 2040 to labor force participation rates fairly similar to those in Denmark today. 
Nevertheless, attempts to actually execute reforms with those goals have faced stiff opposi-
tion in France and Italy, and more recently and to a somewhat lesser extent also in Germany.   12
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Source: Own computations based on the German Mikrozensus (www.destatis.de) and Statistics Denmark 
(www.statbank.dk). 
Figure 6 displays the resulting trajectories of the number of working individuals. Each reform 
step is additive to the one before; hence, the trajectory labeled “UNEMP” corresponds to the 
LREFORM scenario of all four reform elements implemented. 
The trajectories are very different across countries. France can easily compensate the slightly 
declining number of individuals of working age by a combination of two or three of the above 
policy changes, while Germany has no chance to offset the loss in working age population 
even with a combination of all four measures. 
The three countries also differ in the efficacy of the four policy parameters. Note in particular 
Italy with a large jump if female labor force participation adapts to that of men. This is due to 
the very low female labor force participation currently in Italy. The irony is of course that, 
because Italy’s pool of hitherto unused labor capacity (in particular women) is so large, tap-
ping it provides a very large opportunity to counteract the effects of population aging. Italy, 
while aging more than Germany, is thus much better off than Germany which has less room 
to increase labor force participation.   13
Lower labor input as indicated in these figures will most likely slow down Germany’s and 
possibly also Italy’s GDP growth.
2 However, since total population will also decline, this does 
not necessarily imply that standards of living will fall. Figure 7 therefore divides the number 
of working persons by the population aged 15 and older, our support ratio. The main message 
is that a combination of the four policy scenarios can in all countries, more or less also in 
Germany and Italy, stabilize these countries’ support ratio. This is a first very important mes-
sage: lifting labor market constraints and tapping into the pool of currently unused labor can 
offset the force of aging in the three countries of Old Europe. 
                                                 
2  Given the large share of labor in output and the history of total factor productivity, it is unlikely that productiv-
ity growth and capital accumulation can overcompensate the decline in labor force.   14

















































Source: Own calculations   15















































Note: Employment as share of population age 15+, own calculations   16
4. A dynamic open-economy macroeconomic model with exogenous labor 
force participation and endogenous hours’ supply 
We now construct a dynamic open-economy macroeconomic model that allows us to analyze 
the effects of the labor market reforms described in the previous section on GDP and con-
sumption per capita in an aging Europe. As described in the introduction, labor supply has an 
endogenous and an exogenous component. While we treat the reforms and the resulting varia-
tion in employment numbers as exogenous, households in our model endogenously adjust 
hours worked and may thus counteract parts of the labor market reforms. 
Our main assumptions on this interplay between the exogenous variation of employment 
numbers and hours worked are as follows. We model the decision of a household with prefer-
ences over consumption and leisure. Total labor supply of a household of age j as derived 
from the household’s optimization is the product of exogenous employment numbers lj, and 
the endogenous decision on hours worked at age j, hj. The crucial difference between the two 
labor supply components is that hours worked may not exceed the time endowment (which 
we normalize to one) while employment numbers lj, can take any positive value. 
As the age-specific employment lj is exogenously increased, e.g., due to an increase in the 
retirement age, the household endogenously decreases hours worked, hj. In the absence of any 
constraints, the two components of labor supply are perfect substitutes such that the exoge-
nous variation of lj leaves the labor supply of the household unaffected. However, the exoge-
nous variation of lj affects total effective labor supply for those households for whom the time 
endowment constraint is binding. As a consequence, the exogenous employment variation of 
lj has some effect on aggregate effective labor supply but the overall effect is substantially 
smaller than in an alternative specification of our model with fully exogenous labor supply 
where  
4.1 Demography 
Time in our model is discrete and extends from t=0,…,T. Each model period t reflects a time 
interval of 5 years. Our demographic projections, however, are more detailed with an annual 
periodicity. These detailed demographic projections form the background of our analysis. 
Demography is taken as exogenous. It represents one of the main driving force of our simula-
tion model, in addition to exogenous changes in labor supply restrictions and pension policy 
changes.   17
Households in our model economies enter economic life at age 15 which we denote by j=0. 
The maximum age is 100 years. Accordingly the maximum economic age, denoted by J, is 
85. We assume that households give birth between ages 0,…,jf, the age of menopause. Ac-
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where ςt,j,i denotes the age-specific conditional survival rate and ft,j,i the age-specific fertility 
rate. The resulting total fertility rates and life expectancies have been summarized in table 1. 
4.2 Production 
The production sector in each country consists of a representative firm that uses a Cobb-
Douglas production function given by 
(2)  ( )
α α − Ω = Ω =
1
, , , , , , , , , i t i t i t i t i t i t i t L K L K F Y , 
where Kt,i denotes the capital stock and  i t L ,  is aggregate effective labor supply of country i at 
time t. α is the capital share and Ωt,i is the technology level of country i growing at the exoge-
nous rate g. 
The firm’s problem is static such that wages and interest rates are given by 
(3)  ()
α α t i t i t k w − Ω = 1 , , , 
(4)  δ α
α − = t t k r , 
where kt is the capital stock per efficient unit of labor and δ is the depreciation rate of capital.  
4.3 Households 
An exogenous fraction lt,j,i of each household supplies work. This fraction of the household 
endogenously decides on the hours of work ht,j,i. The other fraction of the household, 1-lt,j,I, 
does not work and fully enjoys leisure. Accordingly, total labor supply of a household is 
given by the product of the two components, lt,j,i·ht,j,i and total leisure is therefore 1-lt,j,i·ht,j,i 
whereby we restrict time endowment to one.   18
The household derives utility from consumption ct,j,i and leisure 1-lt,j,i·ht,j,i and the household’s 
per period utility function is given by 
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The maximization problem of a cohort born in period t at j=0 is given by 
(5)  () ∑
=
+ + + −
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where β is the pure time discount factor. In addition to pure discounting, households discount 
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A feature of our model is uncertainty about the time of death expressed in the term  i j t , , π  in 
equation (5). We assume that accidental bequests resulting from premature death are taxed by 
the government at a confiscatory rate and used for otherwise neutral government consump-
tion.
3 We do not include intended bequests in our model. 
Labor productivity changes over the life-cycle according to age-specific productivity parame-
ters εj. Hence, the age-specific wage is  j i t i j t w w ε ⋅ = , , , . 
Denoting total assets by at,j,i, maximization of the household’s intertemporal utility is subject 
to a dynamic budget constraint given by 
(6)  () ( ) ( ) i j t i j t i t i j t i j t i j t t j t i j t c p w h l r a a , , , , , , , , , , , , , 1 , 1 1 1 1 − − + − + + = + + λ τ λ , 
where λ=1 for j=0,…,jr and λ=0 for j>jr and jr is the exogenous retirement age. τt,i is the 
contribution rate to a PAYG financed public pension system and pt,j,i is pension income, see 
below. 
Furthermore, maximization is subject to the constraint that hours worked are positive and may 
not exceed one, hence, 
(7)  1 0 , , ≤ ≤ i j t h . 
                                                 
3  An alternative assumption would be to redistribute accidental bequests to the population according to some 
scheme. The redistribution would however not affect our results much and we therefore opted for this simpli-
fying assumption.   19
In the variant of our model with fully exogenous labor supply we replace the constraint (7) 
with the constraint that  i j t h , , =1 for all t,j,i. 
4.4 Pensions and pension reform 
The only purpose of the government in our model is to organize a prototypical Continental 
European public pension system that is pay-as-you-go financed and provides flat (i.e. not 
earnings-related) pension benefits. We assume that the budget of the pension system is bal-
anced in all t,i such that 
(8)  () ∑ ∑
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where ρt,i denotes the net replacement rate and τt,i the contribution rate of the pension system 
in t,i. Households consider the contributions as pure taxes. 
The main policy parameter is the net replacement rate ρ; the contribution rate τ  responds pas-
sively to balance the pension system’s budget. If ρ is large, public pensions crowd out private 
saving through the households consumption/saving decision given by (5) and (6). Moreover, 
since the benefits are not related to individual earnings, we consider the contributions to the 
pension system as pure taxes with the associated labor supply distortions which work through 
the households labor supply decision given by (5), (6) and (7). 
If ρ = 0, all old age provision will be private savings. This represents the textbook life-cycle 
model in which intertemporal consumption smoothing over the life cycle provides the retire-
ment income through saving in young age and dissaving after retirement. 
Pension reform is modeled as a reduction of the net replacement rate ρ. We will consider two 
polar cases: 
•  FLATSS: maintaining the current country-specific replacement rates also in the future 
(ρt,i = ρ2005,i for t>2005), and 
•  SAVING: abolishing the public pension system altogether (ρt,i = 0) so that all age provi-
sion is private savings   20
4.5 Equilibrium 
Given initial capital stocks K0,i, a competitive equilibrium of the economy is defined as se-
quences of disaggregate variables for the households, { } i j t i j t i j t i j t a h l c , , , , , , , , , , , , sequences of ag-
gregate variables, { } i t i t i t K L C , , , , , , prices for labor as well as contribution rates to the pension 
system, { } i t i t w , , ,τ , in each country i, and a common world interest rate { } t r  such that  
1.  Given prices and initial conditions, households maximize life-time utility in (5) sub-
ject to the constraints in (6) and (7). 
2.  Factor prices equal their marginal productivities as given in equations (3) and (4). 
3.  Government policies satisfy (8) in every period. 
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4.6 Numerical implementation 
Our time line has four periods: a phase-in period, a calibration period, a projection period, and 
a phase-out period. First, we start calculations 110 years before the calibration period begins 
with the assumption of an “artificial” initial steady state in 1850. The time period between 
1960 and 2004 is then used as calibration period in order to determine the structural parame-
ters of the model. Our projections run from 2005 through 2100.
4 The phase-out period after 
2100 has two parts: a transition to a steady-state population in 2200 and an additional 100-
year period until the macroeconomic model reaches a final steady state in 2300. 
                                                 
4  Results are displayed through the year 2050 to show the main period of population aging.   21
We determine the equilibrium path of the overlapping generations model by using the modi-
fied Gauss-Seidel iteration as described in Ludwig (2006). The algorithm searches for equilib-
rium paths of capital to output ratios, and, in case there are social security systems, pension 
contribution rates in each country.  
4.7 Calibration 
The current version of the paper features a calibration that is based on an ad hoc choice of 
parameters by reference to other studies. In future versions of the paper we will specify cer-
tain calibration targets and determine deep structural model parameters by minimum distance 
methods. In particular, we will emphasize a careful calibration of the consumption weight in 
the utility function, φ, that determines the relative preference for labor versus leisure and 
thereby indirectly the number of households at the constraint with hj=1. We currently set 
φ=0.66 which corresponds with the value determined by minimum distance methods in 
Börsch-Supan, Ludwig and Winter (2006).  
The structural model parameters are summarized in table 2. These parameter values refer to 
an annual periodicity of the model. 
TABLE 2: Structural model parameters 
α: capital share in production  0.4 
g: growth rate of labor productivity  0.015 
δ: depreciation rate of capital  0.05 
Ωi: technology level  0.05 - 0.07 
β: discount factor  0.99 
θ: coefficient of relative risk aversion  2 
φ: consumption share parameter  0.66   22
5. Results 
We structure our results by investigating three dimensions, each with two polar assumptions: 
•  Labor market reforms: no reform at all, resulting in future labor force participation rates 
that equal the current ones (STATQUO or SQ) versus the implementation of all four re-
form steps described in section 3 (LREFORM or RF) 
•  Pension reform: a prototypical pension system of Continental Europe, purely pay-as-you-
go, providing flat social security benefits financed by distorting contributions (FLATSS 
or FL) versus a fully-funded, voluntary private accounts system which generates no dis-
tortions (SAVING or SA) as described in subsection 4.5. 
•  Labor supply reaction: Fixed hours supply (EXOGENOUS or EX) versus endogenous 
supply of working hours (ENDOGENOUS or EN) as described in the households optimi-
zation problem, subsection 4.3, equations (5) to (7). 
This set-up yields a two-by-two-by-two table of underlying assumptions displayed in table 3. 
The eight resulting combinations are labeled, e.g., by “FL-SQ-EX” to denote a flat benefit 
pay-as-you-go social security system (FL) with status quo labor force participation (SQ) and 
an exogenously given hours supply (EX), by “SV-RF-EN” to denote a fully-funded private 
savings based old-age provision system (SV) with a comprehensive labor market reform (RF) 
and an hours supply which reacts endogenously to ageing and policy changes (EN), etc. 
TABLE 3: Set up of scenarios 
  Extensive margin: Labor market regime  
  Constant age and gender specific 
labor force participation 
(STATQUO, blue diamonds) 
Increasing age and gender specific 
labor force participation 
(LREFORM, red triangles) 















flat benefits  
(FLATSS, blue line) 
FL-SQ-EX FL-SQ-EN FL-RF-EX FL-RF-EN 
Fully funded voluntary 
accounts  
(SAVING, yellow line) 
SV-SQ-EX SV-SQ-EN SV-RF-EX SV-RF-EN   23
On the following pages, we develop how the outcome variables of our general equilibrium 
model emerge from the three exogenous changes that drive our model:  
•  the demographic aging process in the background, 
•  lifting of labor supply restrictions as described in section 3, and 
•  a fundamental change in the type of pension system. 
We begin with figures that display the evolution of employment, the supply of hours, total 
labor supply, wages, and domestic capital stock. We then present the evolution of our two 
target variables, GDP and consumption per capita.  
All figures refer to the aggregate of France, Germany, and Italy (EU-3). The U.S. is modeled 
in the background with similar changes in retirement age and female labor force participation, 
but no other exogenous policy changes. 
All figures have the same design (cf. table 3). We denote exogenous labor supply by a dashed 
line and endogenous hours’ supply by a solid line. The high labor force participation scenario 
(LREFORM) is marked by red triangles, the constant labor force participation scenario 
(STATQUO) by blue diamonds. Finally, the flat benefits pay-as-you-go social security sys-
tem (FLATSS) features a blue line, while the fully funded pension regime (SAVING) is iden-
tified by a yellow line. The first diagram in each figure shows all eight combinations of the 
scenarios. The following three smaller panels show the differences in each of the three direc-
tions in order to identify interaction effects.   24
7.1 Extensive margin: Employment 
Figure 8 corresponds to figure 6 in section 3 and depicts the evolution of labor supply at the 
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The STATQUO scenario is marked by blue diamonds. It shows a steady decline of the num-
ber of employed persons. The decline is about 20% between 2005 and 2050. 
This is very different from the LREFORM scenario (marked by red triangles). The increase in 
labor force participation due to all four reform steps – earlier entry in, and later exit from, the 
labor market, more women working and less unemployed – more or less stabilizes employ-
ment in the EU-3 area. Labor supply declines only slightly after 2015 but increases again after 
2035, the peak of the ageing process in Continental Europe. Except for the time between 2015 
and 2035, when the losses in employment created by the retirement of the babyboom genera-
tion are very large, the effects of labor market reforms and migration just compensate the ag-
ing effects.   25
7.2 Intensive margin: the supply of hours for given labor force participation 
The supply of working hours now reacts to the exogenous change in labor force participation 
according to the household’s maximization problem as specified in subsection 4.3. We distin-
guish two cases: households which are constrained by the time endowment limit (equation 7 
in section 4.3), and households which are not constrained. 
Given the calibration parameters, about 58% of households are not constrained in 2005, 
mainly middle aged households. The difference between France and Germany on one side, 
and Italy on the other side, is large: in France, 67% of all households are unconstrained, in 
Germany 63%, while only 43% of Italian households can work as much as they would like. 
These households fully undo exogenous policy changes by adjusting their working hours in-
versely, since for them hours h and persons l are perfect substitutes (equations 5 and 6 in sec-
tion 4.3). One might think of these households as a couple. In the status-quo regime, one per-
son was restricted to work while the other person worked as much as the household needed 
for consumption and saving. Once the restriction for the first person was lifted, however, the 
couple distributes the work more equally between the two persons without increasing total 
hours supplied by the household. 
Figure 9 shows this from a microeconomic perspective, i.e., on the level of an individual rep-
resentative households of each age class, separately for each country. For unconstrained 
households (hours less than one), the hours (marked by red squares) respond inversely to the 
changes in participation (blue diamonds) when moving from the status quo (left panels) to the 
LREFORM regime (right panels). 
The remaining 42% of households have been constrained under the labor market policy re-
gimes in 2005. This is the majority in Italy, where 57% of all households are constrained, and 
roughly a third in France (33%) and Germany (37%). These households are shown in figure 9 
as those households which have an hours supply of exactly one: the very young and the old. 
Releasing these constraints generates more hours supply when the policies are phased in over 
time. This is visible in the lower number of households on the hours=1 line in the LREFORM 
scenarios (right panels) than under STATQUO labor force participation (left panels). 
Taking both participation and hours together yields total labor supply of the household 
(marked by yellow triangles in figure 9). It is much higher for the younger and older age 
groups in the LREFORM scenario as compared to the STATQUO scenario, but remains un-  26
changed for the unconstrained middle aged households which perfectly substitute between 
participation and hours supply. 
FIGURE 9: Household labor force participation, hours supply and total labor supply 
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=∑  for a labor force participation of one in all working age households (age 
20-64). Hours are normalized to 100% in 2005 within each scenario. Hence, they are adjusted 
for any level effects generated by pension and labor market policies that create cross-country 
differences already in 2005. 
Figure 10 shows the hours result for the eight scenarios defined in table 3. Population aging 
generates declining hours in all scenarios. There is, of course, no difference among the four 
scenarios with exogenous hours supply as this is fixed to one. It can be interpreted as the 
baseline which reflects the decline in working age population without any reaction in supplied 
working hours. 
The reaction of the endogenous hours’ supply differs by labor market and pension scenario. 
Hours are much lower in the LREFORM scenarios (red triangles) than under constant labor 
force participation rates (STATQUO, blue diamonds). 
There are interesting interaction effects between labor market and pension reform. Without 
labor market reform, hours’ supply is almost identical in the FLATSS and SAVING pension 
scenarios; actually, hours supplied are a bit lower in the pension reform scenario. This relation 
reverts when the labor reforms are put in place. If labor market and pension reform concur, 
hours’ supply is higher than in the case when labor markets are reformed without a pension 
reform.  
A microeconomic perspective of this interaction effect is given in figure 9 for the case of Ger-
many. A comparison between the second and the third left panels shows that the hours 
reduction is much smaller in a funded pension system than in a flat-benefits pay-as-you-go 
system. This reflects the negative incentive effect of high distorting taxes. Under the 
LREFORM scenario (right panels) fewer households are constrained by labor market institu-
tions. More age groups therefore substitute hours for participation within a household. Since 
the hours reduction is much smaller in the funded pension system, more total labor supply 
remains.   28
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Another way to understand the interaction effects is taking first differences in the direction of 
each dimension of the two-by-two-by-two table 3. This is done in the three smaller panels of 
figure 10 labeled “interaction effects”. The first panel shows the impact of a radical social 
security reform. Hours increase under a funded system via-a-vis the pay-as-go system if ex-
ogenous labor force participation also increases. The difference is zero if hours are exoge-
nous, and very small, but negative if labor force participation remains at status quo. 
The second panel displays the difference between higher and unchanged exogenous labor 
force participation. Hours react negatively because of intra-household substitution between 
hours and labor force participation. This effect offsets some, but not all of the higher labor 
force participation as we will see in the following subsection. The offsetting effect is higher in 
a distorting pay-as-you-go system. We may interpret the additional difference between the 
two lines in the second interaction effect as an incentive effect due to distorting taxes, while 
the difference between the horizontal axis and the yellow line is the substitution effect be-
tween hours and labor force participation. 
The third panel summarizes these effects as it displays the difference between endogenous 
and exogenous hours’ supply under the four combinations of pension and labor market re-
gimes while the two former graphs can be interpreted as differences in differences. Quite 
clearly, there is a strong and beneficial interaction between changing the pension system and 
lifting labor market restrictions. This is an important result of our paper. 
7.3 Putting all together: total effective labor supply 
Total labor effective supply is the product of working persons (figure 8) and hours per person 
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Its evolution under the eight scenarios is displayed in figure 11. If hours are exogenous, there 
is no difference between figures 8 and 11, and there is no difference between the two pension 
scenarios. Hence, the lines for FL-RF-EX and SV-RF-EX at the very top overlap as well as 
the lines representing FL-SQ-EX and SV-SQ-EX at the very bottom. This is also visible in the 
first panel on interaction effects. 
                                                 
5  See section 6. All graphs in section 4 are based on a flat age-productivity profile (εj=1). Aggregate results are 
not sensitive to the age-productivity profile.   30
If hours are endogenous, the increase in the number of working persons in the LREFORM 
scenario is only partially reduced by the decline in hour’s supply that we have seen in fig-
ure 10. Figure 11 is the aggregate picture representing the total labor supply of the various age 
groups depicted in figure 9 (yellow triangles). 
The first panel on interaction effects shows again the strong interaction between pension re-
form and labor market reform: relative to the current pay-as-you-go system, total labor supply 
increase strongly after 2020 in the LREFORM scenario, while it declines if labor force par-
ticipation remains unchanged. 
   31
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7.4 Hourly wage rate 
The hourly wage rate is depicted in Figure 12. It more or less reflects the supply of total effec-
tive labor with some additional effects due to capital accumulation, see the following subsec-
tion. 
The hourly wage increases more in the STATUSQUO (blue diamonds) than in the 
LREFORM (red triangles) scenario, reflecting relative scarcity. It increases much stronger 
under a funded system (yellow lines) than under pay-as-you-go (blue lines). The additional 
capital accumulation lowers interests and raises labor productivity, thus also the wage rate. 
Finally, the wage rate increase more when hours are exogenous (dashed lines). This effect is 
very small when labor force participation rates do not change (STATQUO) but it is substan-
tial in the LREFORM scenario, when the hours’ reaction is large. 
Considering the massive decline in total labor supply, the hourly wage rate reacts somewhat 
dampened with an elasticity of about 0.5 (compare figures 11 and 12).   33
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7.5 Capital accumulation 
Figure 13 depicts the evolution of the combined domestic capital stock of France, Germany, 
and Italy. As expected, capital accumulation is much higher under a funded pension system 
than in a pay-as-you-go system as can be seen in the first panel of interactions. There is also 
substantially more capital accumulation in the high labor force participation scenario 
(LREFORM) as compared to constant participation (STATQUO). This is visible in the sec-
ond panel on interaction effects. Finally, the third panel shows that capital accumulation is 
higher if endogenous hours’ supply is not dampening the effect of a higher labor force par-
ticipation. 
Combining these three effects yields the top diagram of figure 13. Capital accumulation is 
highest under a fully-funded system with high labor force participation and no dampening 
effect of endogenous hours (SV-RF-EX). It is lowest in a pay-as-you-go system with status-
quo labor force participation and the full force of negative incentive effects (FL-SQ-EN).   35
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7.6 GDP per capita 
Our first target variable is economic growth, measured as the change in GDP per capita, net of 
exogenous growth in total factor productivity. This is displayed in figure 14. Economic 
growth relative to secular productivity growth is very much affected by the combination of 
pension and labor market policies. With exogenous hours, growth is highest and always posi-
tive when labor supply restrictions are released and pensions are financed by a funded system. 
In turn, growth (after adjusting for TFP increases) is lowest and always negative under the 
opposite combination of policies. This is a strong message: in spite of aging, economic 
growth can be as high as historically given by the estimated long-run growth of total factor 
productivity. It can even be increased by a smart combination of pension and labor market 
policies. However, it can also secularly decline behind the path which we have experienced in 
the past.  
The quantities are large: the difference between the best and the worst scenario is about 20% 
in 2040 and 30% in 2050. This must be seen in comparison to total factor productivity growth 
which is about 90% over the period from 2005 to 2050, almost doubling output.
6 Remaining 
at status quo in terms of labor market and pension policy will “eat up” about a third of pro-
ductivity growth. Reform backlash is about half of this: it reduces the effect of labor market 
reform on GDP per capita to about half the size with unchanged hours’ supply. 
The eight output paths in figure 14 can be derived as a straightforward combination of labor 
and capital inputs displayed in figures 11 and 13. Output per capita is unequivocally higher in 
a fully-funded pension system without distorting taxes as compared to a pay-as-you-go pen-
sion system with flat benefits. Output per capita is similarly clearly higher when labor market 
restrictions are removed (LREFORM) than in the status-quo scenario. The latter two findings 
are clearly seen in the first two small panels below the large diagram. 
The third panel shows the interaction between pension and labor market policies in the case of 
endogenous supply of working hours. Endogenous hours’ supply reduces growth relative to a 
situation when households cannot substitute more persons by less hours. This is shown by the 
two lines at the bottom of this graph (FL-RF and SV-RF). The effect, however, is smaller 
when the pension system is fully funded (SV-RF). 
                                                 
6  The growth path with this productivity increase, without population aging and reform effects, ist represented 
by the horizontal 100%-line in figure 14.   37
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7.7 Consumption per capita 
Finally, figure 15 displays our second target variable, living standards measured by consump-
tion per capita. As we did it for output, we normalize consumption per capita by secular total 
productivity growth. The evolution of living standards very much parallels that of GDP per 
capita; there are no major deviations in the growth patterns of output and consumption as it 
concerns the relative position of the eight scenarios. 
Saving in young age and dissaving in old age, however, smoothes some of the effects that we 
have seen in figure 14. A notable example is the evolution of living standards in the fully-
funded pensions, high labor force participation, and endogenous hours’ supply scenario (SV-
RF-EN). Living standards remain very close to the secular growth path (the horizontal line), 
while the associated GDP per capita exhibited a stronger increase until 2020 followed by a 
strong decline. 
This shows that a smart combination of labor market and pension policies can stabilize living 
standards in Continental Europe in spite of population aging and an adverse behavioral reac-
tion to the structural policy changes. In turn, this stabilization needs more than a half-hearted 
pension reform or a few adjustments in labor market restrictions. All labor market policies 
described in section 3 are needed in addition to a secular pension reform; other policy scenar-
ios imply that living standards in Continental Europe will grow slower than what we have 
experienced in the past. Living standards will not decline because secular productivity growth 
is still stronger than aging. Living standards, however, will decline relative to all other coun-
tries that age less than Continental Europe.   39
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6. Productivity issues 
If labor productivity is age dependent, a shift in the age structure will also bring about a 
change in aggregate productivity, even if age-specific productivity were to remain constant. 
Moreover, if labor productivity declines strongly after, say, age 60, an increase in retirement 
age will not have much effect on aggregate output. This brief section provides a gross esti-
mate of the approximate magnitude of this effect. 
This is not a simple task, however, as there is no reliable data available on age-specific labor 
productivity, see the review by Skirbekk (2004). Barth et al. (1993) conclude from a survey of 
human resource executives in 406 organizations that “Older workers were consistently rated 
as having more positive attitudes being more reliable and possessing better skills than the av-
erage worker; they were rated worse than the average worker when it comes to health care 
costs, flexibility in accepting new assignments, and suitability for training.” Hutchins (2001) 
questions the usefulness of such employer survey to address these issues because of justifica-
tion bias. Kotlikoff and Wise (1989) evaluate confidential data originating from a major US 
American service enterprise in which output is well defined. They provide two estimates 
which can be used to proxy productivity. One measure uses age and seniority-specific earn-
ings of sales staff which can be measured by the sale of insurance contracts, hence a kind of 
piece rate. Corrected for seniority, the age profile of these piece rates is relatively flat. Their 
second measure is the entry salary of clerks. This profile is much more hump shape. Both 
measures are likely to suffer from selection effects. Börsch-Supan, Düzgün and Weiss (2006) 
use another approach. They used confidential data on error rates in a large assembly line style 
car manufacturing factory. Output and production times are perfectly controllable in this envi-
ronment, permitting a direct estimate of productivity. They find that age and experience ef-
fects cancel, such that the resulting productivity profile is essentially flat, with reliable obser-
vations until about age 63. 
How do these microeconomic differences translate into macroeconomic differences? In order 
to get some feeling, we underlie our simulations with two alternative age-productivity profiles 
(in our model represented by εj, see subsection 4.3). One profile is flat; the other imposes the 
sharp hump shape depicted in figure 16. It features a strong decline of productivity after age 
60. We treat these age profiles as exogenous.   41













Figures 17 describes which difference it makes whether the age productivity profile is flat or 
whether it is hump-shaped. Figure 17 is computed under the assumptions of exogenous hours 
supply and the current pay-as-you-go system. We display the two extreme employment sce-
narios, STATQUO and LREFORM. In spite of the strong hump shape of figure 16, there is 
not much difference in the resulting GDP per capita, a result which may surprise. 
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7. Conclusions 
We have simulated a set of far-reaching pension and labor market policies and investigated 
their impact on production and consumption per capita in three large Continental European 
countries. A new feature of our computational general equilibrium model is a combination of 
exogenous changes of labor supply at the extensive margin (metaphorically represented in our 
model by the number of working persons) and endogenous responses of labor supply at the 
intensive margin (metaphorically called working hours). We think of exogenous changes as 
lifting institutional restrictions generated by the school system, actuarially unfair pension sys-
tems, inflexible working hours, and unavailable day care facilities. The endogenous compo-
nent of labor supply (“hours” chosen by the household members) reacts to the exogenous 
component of labor supply (“working persons” freed from labor market restrictions), but also 
to social security taxes and to the aging process itself and its repercussions. 
Our paper shows that direct quantity and indirect behavioral effects are large. They both sig-
nificantly affect economic growth and living standards. Due to the strong interaction effects 
between pension system and labor markets, a smart combination of pension policy and adap-
tation of institutions related to the labor market can do more than such policies in isolation. 
We show that they could easily offset the effects of population aging on economic growth and 
living standards if there were no endogenous behavioral reactions. On balance, these behav-
ioral effects dampen reform efforts, thus representing reform backlashes in our model. Taking 
behavioral effects into account, a combination of many policy measures is necessary in order 
to keep per capita consumption from falling behind the secular growth path. If these measures 
are taken, Old Europe can maintain her high living standards in spite of aging. This is an im-
portant message for the never ending reform debate on the European Continent. 
The key of our approach – the combination of an exogenous variation of employment rates 
with endogenous hours choice – has its advantages and disadvantages. It provides a theoreti-
cally consistent way to model the subtle balance between policy changes and individual reac-
tions. From an empirical point of view, this approach puts a lot of pressure to get the calibra-
tion right in order to achieve a realistic number of households that are constrained by labor 
market restrictions (expressed less metaphorically: the balance between what is exogenous 
and what is endogenous in labor supply). The current version of the paper features a calibra-
tion that is based on an ad hoc choice of parameters by reference to other studies. In future   43
versions of the paper we will specify certain calibration targets and determine deep structural 
model parameters by minimum distance methods as we have done in earlier work. 
From a theoretical point of view, we do not model a motive for households to actually partici-
pate in the labor market. An alternative approach making the metaphorical distinction more 
realistic would be to model the decisions endogenously at both margins. This could be done 
by accounting for home production and preferences for leisure goods as in Greenwood and 
Vandenbroucke (2005) and by explicitly modeling the institutions that determine households 
labor market participation decision, e.g., along the lines of Garibaldi and Wasmer (2005) and 
Guner, Kaygusuz and Ventura (2008). We speculate that removing these frictions would lead 
to stronger total labor supply reactions than in our model. Such extensions of our model are 
subject of future research. 
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